Abstract. Conceptual Structures (CS) Theory is a logic-based knowledge representation formalism. To show that conceptual graphs have the power of rst-order logic, it is necessary to have a mapping between both formalisms. A proof system, i.e. axioms and inference rules, for conceptual graphs is also useful. It must be sound (no false statement is derived from a true one) and complete (all possible tautologies can be derived from the axioms). This paper shows that Sowa's original de nition of the mapping is incomplete, incorrect, inconsistent, and unintuitive, and the proof system is incomplete too. To overcome these problems a new translation algorithm is given and a complete proof system is presented. Furthermore, the framework is extended for higher-order types.
Due to space limitations, steps 1 and 4 have been omitted 1 . They can be found in Wermelinger, 1995] which also includes the higher-order type framework to be used by and the inference rules. That framework is a simpli ed and yet more expressive formulation of the formal proposal for incorporating higherorder types into CS Theory presented in Wermelinger and Lopes, 1994] .
The structure of the paper is straightforward. The next section presents an overview of the adopted higher-order type system, and the other two main sections deal with the operator and the inference rules, respectively. The reader is expected to have some knowledge of conceptual graphs and logic. Most examples are adapted from Sowa, 1984; Sowa, 1992] .
Higher-Order Types
The building units of conceptual graphs are types. There is a concept type hierarchy T C and a relation type hierarchy T R . Both of them are lattices. The top element of T C is the universal concept type > c , and the bottom element is the absurd concept type ? c . Similarly, the universal relation type > r and the absurd relation type ? r are the top and bottom elements of T R . Concept types are classi ed according to their kind and order, and relation types are classi ed according to their arity and order.
There are two kinds of concept types: relational and non-relational ones. The former denote relations, the latter do not. The set of all relational concept types is written T rc , and T nc represents all non-relational ones. Concept types can also be classi ed according to their order: T rc i is the set of ith-order relational concept types, and the symbol T nc i stands for the set of all ith-order non-relational concept types. Both > c and ? c can be of any kind and order. Therefore, they stand apart from the other concept types and aren't included in T rc or T nc . As for relation types, each has an associated arity and order. The set of all n-ary relation types is written as T r hni and the set of all ith-order relation types is represented by T r i . Again, > r and ? r do not belong to any of those sets. Simply put, a higher-order type denotes a set of lower-order types, and if t 1 is a subtype of t 2 then the denotation of t 1 must be a subset of t 2 's denotation. More speci cally, relational concept types denote relation types, non-relational concept types denote other non-relational concept types, and relation types denote tuples of concept types 2 . Therefore, if t 1 is a subtype of t 2 then both must be of the same kind. Furthermore, if t 1 and t 2 are relation types they must have the same arity. That way relation nodes can be generalized or specialized without removing or adding concept nodes to the graph.
Example 2. The only subtype relationships (represented by <) among the types of the previous example are: { CAT < FELINE < ANIMAL; { SQUARE is the maximal common subtype of RECTANGLE and RHOMBUS; { PARTIAL-ORDER is the maximalcommon subtype of TRANSITIVE, REFLEXIVE, and ANTI-SYM which in turn are subtypes of BINARY; { SYMMETRIC < BINARY < RELATION.
A concept t : m indicates that m is an entity of type t. In other words, m is an element of the denotation of t. Therefore, if t is a relational concept type then m must be a relation type. Otherwise, i.e. if t is a non-relational concept type, then so is m. To sum up, relation types and non-relational concept types can be used as markers, too. However, as rst-order non-relational concept types denote individuals (and not types), a new set T nc 0 of \zero-order types" is needed. The elements of T nc 0 are mutually incomparable since they represent individuals. All other markers are organized into (disjoint) lattices since they are types. The marker set M is therefore a partially ordered set. If we add the generic marker * as a top element and the absurd marker * as a bottom element, then M becomes a lattice too, like T C and T R . 2 The arguments of a rst-order relation are non-relational types, and a higher-order relation has as arguments lower-order relations. But as conceptual graphs are bipartite, those arguments must be represented by concepts. Hence the need for relational concept types.
3 Translation
To show the logical foundations of conceptual graphs, the rst step consists in nding a correspondence, i.e. a translation algorithm, between graphs and closed formulas 3 of some rst-order language. The latter is implicitly de ned by the transformation process. In CS Theory, the translation is given by the operator. Let us recall its de nition as given in Sowa, 1984] { Represent each concept c as a monadic predicate whose name is the same as type(c) and whose argument is identi er(c).
{ Represent each n-adic conceptual relation r of u as an n-adic predicate whose name is the same as type(r). For each i from 1 to n, let the ith argument of the predicate be the identi er of the concept linked to the ith arc of r.
{ Then u has a quanti er pre x 9x 1 : : :9x k and a body consisting of the conjunction of all the predicates for the concepts and conceptual relations of u. erase all coreference links in u; The formula u is the result of applying to the transformed version of u with the following rule for mapping concepts with multiple referents: if b is a concept of u of the form t : x 1 = x 2 = : : : = x n ], then b has the form t(x 1 )^x 1 = x 2^: : :^x 1 = x n .
Although these de nitions seem trivial, there are several things to notice about them. In the rst place, the universal type > (using Sowa's notation) and the absurd type ? aren't handled in any special way. Furthermore, a negation sign can never appear immediately before a predicate; there must be always an existential quanti er between them. Notice also that each context corresponds to a closed formula except for one case. If a concept c 1 in context p 1 is dominated by a generic concept c 2 which is in p 2 6 = p 1 , then the variable corresponding to c 2 appears free in the translation of p 1 , but it is bounded in the formula (p 2 ).
Having these particularities in mind, consider the formula 8x P(x) where P is any unary predicate. Since only uses the existential quanti er, the formula must be rewritten as :9x :P(x). Because of the negated literal, further transformation is necessary in order to get :9x :9y P(y)^y = x which can be represented by the incomplete graph : : P: *y= P . But if we apply the formal de nition of to that graph we obtain :(9x T(x)^:(9y P(y)^y = x)) which is only equivalent to the original formula if T(x) is true for any x. To sum up, the formal de nition of the operator is inconsistent, incomplete, and not intuitive. The fundamental reason is just one: the translation process doesn't re ect the usual interpretation of > as`true' and ? as`false'.
But negated types convey that special meaning of the universal type. Therefore, Assumption 3.3.2, besides not being intuitive, is not consistent with Definition 4.2.8. Furthermore, that interpretation of > is absolutely necessary for conceptual graphs to be able to represent any closed rst-order formula, hence the incompleteness of .
Adding to the problems mentioned above, the de nition of is not totally correct. On one hand, the empty context gets translated simply into () which is not a well-formed rst-order formula because there is no predicate. On the other hand, Assumption 4.2.3 doesn't impose any ordering for the translation of graphs in the same context. That might lead to a formula di erent from the intended one, if there are coreference links. Consider the graph : CAT DOG which is supposed to state \there is a dog which is not a cat". Applying Assumption 4.2.6, one gets : CAT: *y=*x] DOG:*x] which can be translated into :(9y Cat(y)^y = x)^9x Dog(x) or 9x Dog(x)^:(9y Cat(y)^y = x) depending on the chosen order. The formulas are not logically equivalent because x is free in the rst formula. Thus, only the second one corresponds to the intuitive meaning of the graph.
The new translation algorithm given by the ten rules of De nition 1 overcomes all these problems and it also handles higher-order types. However, the basic mechanism remains the same as in Sowa's approach: each concept is assigned a unique variable (rule 2) which is existentially quanti ed (rule 5); those variables are copied from the dominating to the dominated concepts (rules 4 and 6); the formula corresponding to a graph consists of an existential quanti er prex followed by the conjunction of the predicates generated by the concepts and relations (rule 8); and negative contexts translate into negated formulas (rule 10).
Let us rst see how the above mentioned problems are dealt with. In order to be able to represent any closed rst-order formula, the universal type must be translated into a true predicate which simultaneously introduces a new variable. The equality predicate is an obvious candidate. For clarity, it will be written as an in x operator. Furthermore, the symbol :
= was chosen to avoid any confusion with the meta-level equality = used in de nitions. Therefore, >c will be translated as x : = x (rule 6) where x is the variable associated to the concept. Concepts with the absurd type or the absurd marker are always false and correspond thus to the formula :x : = x 4 (rule 6). Similarly for the universal and absurd relation types (rule 7). Handling empty contexts, the second problem, is just as easy. According to Sowa, 1984, p. 151] , \an empty set of graphs makes no assertion whatever. By convention, it is assumed to be true." This means that having no graph is the same as having >c . Hence, by inserting this concept into each empty context (rule 1), the usual translation process will take care of the rest. Finally, to prevent from generating incompatible formulas for graphs in the same context, the quanti er pre x of each graph must be moved to the front of the whole formula (rule 9).
Having xed 's de nition, let us extend it to handle higher-order types. In the new framework, types can be used as markers, and therefore there is also a partial order over markers. Furthermore, higher-order graphs are mainly used for meta-level statements. This means that the interpretation of coreference links should be slightly di erent. Consider the graph g = SHAPE: #rhombus SHAPE: #rectangle If the markers represent single individuals, and therefore SHAPE is a rst-order type, g states that \a rhombus is the same shape as a rectangle". In logic, the equivalent statement is Shape(rhombus)^rhombus : = rectangle^Shape(rectangle) (1) However, if one considers RHOMBUS and RECTANGLE to be rst-order types, and SHAPE to be second-order, then the intuitive reading should be \there is a shape which is both a rhombus and a rectangle". The new translation should be 9x Shape(x)^x v rhombus^x v rectangle (2) where v is a special predicate (written as an in x operator) denoting the partial order among markers. Notice that formula 1 is false, but 2 is true since x can be substituted by SQUARE. However, the translation generated by won't be exactly as formula 2. Let us see why. Both relation types and non-relational concept types can appear to the left or to the right of`:' in a concept. In other words, most types can be used as markers too. This means that they can be translated as predicates or constants. For example, ( CAT: #Garfield ) = Cat(gar eld) but ( SPECIES: #cat ) = Species(cat) where Cat and cat are di erent logical symbols. With the purpose of using as few symbols as possible, the form Holds(cat; gar eld) will be used instead of Cat(gar eld). The \meta-predicate" Holds (similar to the one used in the KIF language Genesereth and Fikes, 1992] ) can also be applied to relations. For example, Agnt(x; y) will be written as Holds(agnt; x; y). Formally, as each predicate must have a xed arity, there is not a single Holds but a set fHolds i ji > 0g where i is the arity of the relation type that appears as the rst argument of the predicate. Concept types can be seen as unary relation types and therefore t : m won't be translated to T(m) anymore but to Holds 1 (t; m) instead (rule 6). Similarly the atomic formula R(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) will be rewritten as Holds n (r; x 1 ; : : :; x n ) (rule 7). The predicate Holds i has therefore arity i + 1.
The Notice that relational concept types can't appear in the referent eld of concepts. Therefore, they can't be translated to logical constants and as such can't be quanti ed over or appear as arguments of some Holds i . This means that t : m will generate t(m) when t is a relational concept type.
De nition1. The translation of conceptual graphs to rst-order logic is done according to the rules that follow. The functions , p , b return for each conceptual graph a sequence of logical symbols. The sequence (g) is the rst-order formula for graph g, and it consists of the quanti er pre x p (g) and the body b (g). For each concept c, the auxiliary functions id, cl, and dom return, respectively, a variable that uniquely identi es c, a boolean that indicates if c is attached to a coreference link, and the set of identi ers of the concepts that dominate c. When necessary, the operator explicity represents the concatenation of symbol sequences. Several translation examples follow. They show the di erence between the old and the new de nition of , and illustrate how some previously problematic cases are now handled. Table 2 gives further examples. = gar eld^Holds 1 (chase; x)^Holds 1 (dog; y)Ĥ olds 2 (agnt; x; z)^Holds 2 (obj ; x; y) Example 5. The formula 8x P(x) states basically that \if x is some entity then P(x) is true". Let P be any relational type 5 . Then This formula is equivalent to 8x x : = x ! 9y P(y)^y : = x. Due to the properties of equality, x : = x is always true and P(y)^y : = x corresponds to P(x). Thus one gets 8x P(x) as expected. The operator just translates a sequence of symbols of some language (Conceptual Graphs) into another sequence of symbols (called formula) of some other language ( rst-order logic). For this process to have any meaning, the resulting formulas must have an interpretation. Classically, an interpretation of a rstorder language L is a pair hD; i where the denotation function maps constants of L into elements of the domain D and predicates into tuples of elements of D. The new de nition of interpretation Wermelinger, 1995] just adds the constraints presented informally in Section 2.
Inference
Theoretically, the translation and interpretation of conceptual graphs is important to show the formalism's expressiveness. But the main goal is to have inference rules that operate directly on conceptual graphs, instead of translating the graphs to formulas, do the proofs with them and then translating back to the graphical form.
The proof system given in Sowa, 1984] consists of a single axiom, the empty set of graphs, and several rst-order rules of inference. These are mainly based on the depth of a graph, i.e. on how many negative contexts one must traverse to reach the graph starting from the outer context. Depending on the depth, the graph is said to be in an evenly enclosed or oddly enclosed context. Even contexts contain true graphs and odd contexts contain false graphs. Therefore, conditions (i.e, graphs and coreference links) can be removed from the former and added to the latter. As simple and elegant it is, Sowa's system must be changed, even if one considers the corrected version of and no higher-order types. In fact, there are now several ways of representing truth, and each true graph that can't be derived from others must be an axiom. Otherwise the system won't be complete. Moreover, a new rule must be added: axioms may be inserted and removed from any context. Without these changes the universal instantion rule can't be applied to conceptual graphs. Using the old notation for clarity, consider the example 8x Cat(x)`Cat(gar eld). In graphical form the hypothesis CAT . By the individuation rule, a individual marker can be iterated from a dominating concept to a dominated one 6 and the coreference link may be erased, provided the dominated concept is generic. We thus get CAT: #Garfield but can't proceed any further because graphs can't be removed from odd contexts.
The remaining of this section presents therefore a new formal proof system. For the most part it is similar to Sowa's. The changes that were done (including the above mentioned) are due to the type and marker hierarchies, the new interpretation of universal and absurd types, and the new meaning of coreference links resulting from the use of higher-order types.
In Sowa, 1984] only concept types formed a hierarchy. Relation types and markers were incomparable. Therefore, the inference rules only enabled one to restrict concept types, i.e. to substitute them by subtypes, and to replace the generic marker by an individual marker, or the other way round. In this framework, relation types and markers may also be (un)restricted but there are some limitations. Let t and t 0 be any concept or relation types, such that t is a subtype of t 0 . Therefore, if Holds n (t; x 1 ; : : :; x n ) is true, then Holds n (t 0 ; x 1 ; : : :; x n ) is also true, and if the latter is false, so is the former. Thus any type may be unrestricted in evenly enclosed contexts and it may be substituted by a subtype in oddly enclosed contexts. In this respect higher-order types don't change the original inference rules.
However, markers can't be changed at will. Consider Examples 1 and 3: CAT is a subtype of FELINE which is a GENUS while CAT is a SPECIES. If the graph SPECIES: #cat is in an evenly enclosed context it is true, but it can't be generalized to the false graph SPECIES: #feline . Similarly, if the latter is in an oddly enclosed context, it can't be specialized to the former. To sum up, individual markers can't be (un)restricted to other individual markers but they can be transformed into the generic or absurd markers. For example, the true graph There is one more situation where markers can be restricted. Consider a concept c 1 , with marker m 1 and identi er x 1 , dominating a concept c 2 with referent m 2 and associated variable x 2 . Then, the condition x 2 : = x 1 enables one to iterate any condition on x 1 from c 1 's context to c 2 's context. This corresponds to the replacement of m 2 by m 12 , the greatest lower bound of m 1 and m 2 : if x 1 v m 1 and x 2 v m 2 then x 2 v m 12 7 (assuming x 2 : = x 1 ). Notice however that the restriction on m 2 can only be done if the result isn't the absurd marker, because a false graph might be obtained if c 2 is evenly enclosed. If c 2 were oddly enclosed the last line of Table 1 would apply and therefore this new rule, which nds an upper limit for the value x 2 that satis es the formula, wouldn't be needed.
As for logical axioms, Sowa only uses the empty set of graphs. As seen in the previous section, some predicate true(x) is needed in order to be able to represent all closed formulas of rst-order logic. That predicate turned out to be the equality :
=. Therefore, the new axioms are graphs whose translation is some tautology based on x : = x. Looking at De nition 1 the possibilities listed in Table 2 are obtained, where m and m 0 are any markers di erent from * and t; t 0 are any concept types (although the given translations assume that they are non-relational).
It is obvious that the graphs involving > r and ? r may have any arity. However, there is a subtle di erence. The mere presence of the absurd type ? r automatically makes the graph false, and therefore the axiom true. The concepts used as relation arguments are thus irrelevant. But the same does not happen with the universal type > r . The concepts to which it is linked must be true too for the whole graph to be true. It is also worth noticing that translates the empty context in the same way as >c . The rules of inference will of course 7 See Example 9. Finally, the rules for handling coreference links are basically the same as in Sowa, 1984] when the dominated concept is rst-order. Otherwise a coreference link can't be inserted or removed in the general case. Let us see why. Consider again concepts c 1 and c 2 mentioned before. When a coreference link is drawn the following happens:
1. The condition x 2 : = x 1 is added to the context of c 2 .
2. The condition x 2 = m 2 becomes x 2 v m 2 if m 2 6 2 T nc 0 f*; *g. 3. The condition x 1 = m 1 becomes x 1 v m 1 if m 1 6 2 T nc 0 f*; *g.
The erasure of a coreference link consists in doing the opposite actions. Due to step 1, coreference links can't be inserted when c 2 is evenly enclosed, and they can't be removed if c 2 is in an odd context. Additionally, if c 2 is a higherorder concept, step 2 applies. In this case inserting a coreference link relaxes the condition (i.e., it could become true), and therefore c 2 can't be oddly enclosed. = x 1 for c 2 . Again, due to their equivalence, insertion of a coreference link corresponds to an iteration. Table 3 summarizes the preceding observations. No action is possible for the unlisted cases. It should be obvious that it is not necessary to check any restrictions if the coreference link to be inserted or removed is an exact copy of another existing one. Also, since coreference links represent equalities, they may be inserted or removed according to the transitivity rule.
The inference rules can at last be presented.
De nition2. Let S be a set of conceptual graphs in the outer context. Any graph derived from S by the following rst-order rules of inference is said to be provable from S.
Equivalence In any context, a logical axiom may be inserted or removed, a double negation may be drawn or erased around any set of graphs.
Generalization In an evenly enclosed context, any type or marker may be unrestricted, and any graph or coreference link may be deleted, as long as the conditions in Tables 1 and 3 are obeyed.
Specialization In an oddly enclosed context, any type or marker may be restricted, and any graph or coreference link may be inserted, as long as the conditions in Tables 1 and 3 are obeyed.
Iteration A graph may be copied from context c to any context dominated by c, and coreference links may be drawn between the original concepts and their copies.
Deiteration
The result of some possible iteration may be deleted. 8 The same reasoning applies to c1 if it isn't a rst-order concept.
Transitivity The rst graph corresponds indeed to the given type hierarchy fragment, as can be easily seen by the translation of it:
:9x Holds 1 (cat; x)^::9y Holds 1 (feline; y)^y :
9z Holds 1 (animal; z)^z :
= y or more simply 8x Holds 1 (cat; x) ! 8yHolds 1 (feline; y)^x : = y ! 9z Holds 1 (animal; z)^z :
= y This formula is equivalent to 8x8y Holds 1 (cat; x)^Holds 1 (feline; y)^x : = y ! 9z Holds 1 (animal; z)^z : = y which is the translation of the second graph. Obviously, it can be rewritten as 8x8y Holds 1 (cat; x)^Holds 1 (feline; y)^x :
= y ! 9z Holds 1 (animal; z)^z : = x corresponding to the last graph.
Conclusions
This paper has provided a closer look at the logical foundations of Conceptual Structures Theory. It was shown that the original formal de nitions of Sowa, 1984] are incomplete: on one hand, some closed rst-order formulas can't be represented with conceptual graphs, on the other hand the universal instantiation rule is missing. Therefore, the de nitions of the operator and of the rst-order inference rules have been corrected. Furthermore, they have been extended to handle higher-order types.
It is hoped that this paper provides a rst step towards a meta-level reasoning engine and a deeper investigation of the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic properties of Conceptual Structures.
